Is Afghanistan a necessary war?

There has been very little good news about Afghanistan lately:

Even military officials have commented on the situation in Afghanistan:

It's not surprising when public opinion shows a growing opposition to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. According to the latest CNN poll, 57 percent of Americans oppose the war in Afghanistan and 62 percent say that the U.S. "is not winning" the war in Afghanistan.

Amidst a dominating health care debate, the question of Afghanistan has resurfaced: Is Afghanistan a necessary war?

President Obama defended the Afghanistan strategy on August 17th saying:

"This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans."

President Obama's rational assumes strong ties between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, where their collaboration would turn Afghanistan into a safe haven for terrorists - and this leaves us no choice but to maintain a military presence there.

Is this an accurate rational? Can al-Qaeda rely on the Taliban? Is this a war of necessity?

Stephen Walt, in his Foreign Policy article "The 'safe haven' myth" offers a cogent skepticism against effective Taliban/al-Qaeda collusion. He argues:

"Most of the people we are fighting in Afghanistan aren't dedicated jihadis...their agenda is focused on local affairs. Moreover, the Taliban itself is a more of a loose coalition of different groups than a tightly unified and hierarchical organization, which is why some experts believe we ought to be doing more to divide the movement and "flip" the moderate elements to our side."

Even if we overlook their focus with local affairs and lack of organizational structure, what incentive would the Taliban have for aiding al-Qaeda in a grand strike on U.S. soil. Walt brings up a good point that our invasion in 2001 remains a fresh memory for them, and it's unrealistic to assume they would act in a way that invites our retaliation. It seems that the White House's argument of an unchecked Taliban collaborating with al-Qaeda is premised on worst case scenarios.

Is Afghanistan still a war of necessity then?

Richard N. Haass, in his New York Times article, "In Afghanistan, the choice is ours", declared it a war of choice (albeit a "tough choice") because there is little reason to assume that the military option would provide better results than other options.

"The risk of ending the military effort in Afghanistan is that Kabul could be overrun and the government might fail. The risk of the current approach is that it might produce the same results in the end, but at a higher human, military and economic cost."

Haass argues that even if the U.S. were to "succeed" in establishing a strong government that controls most of its territory - "terrorists could still operate from there and would put down roots elsewhere. And Pakistan's future would remain uncertain at best."

Furthermore, our expectations of a centralized and democratic government acting as a panacea may not be realistic. He says, "it is not obvious that Afghans can overcome ethnic and tribal loyalties, corruption and personal loyalties. No matter who is declared the winner, yesterday's election is almost certain to leave the country even more divided." Afghanistan has no history of a strong centralized government and building one offers no guarantee of forming a cohesive national identity or dissolving the Taliban.

Ultimately, for Haass, the choice is ours because we have options; we can reduce troop levels, rely on drone attacks, train Afghan police and soldiers, offer aid, engage in diplomacy, etc.

In weighing all of these, let us not forget that there are possible negative consequences to our military intervention. Though Afghanistan remains internally divided, its history shows a capability of unifying to expel hostiles. The U.S. should respect such history, especially with reports of Karzai bolstering his support by portraying himself as the candidate willing to confront the U.S. In other words, our presence there may not always be welcomed.

Ultimately, the White House has to be careful that their sense of necessity is not preconceived or justified by worst case scenario thinking. An administration that leaps to the assumption of military necessity ignores other viable and peaceful means of resolution. In short, all options should be on the table so that this may not become another costly and deadly war.